‘Firing cannons to kill mosquitoes' : controlling virtual ‘streets’ and the ‘image of the state’ in Bangladesh. by Lacy,  Mark & Mookherjee,  Nayanika
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
21 April 2020
Version of attached le:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached le:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Lacy, Mark and Mookherjee, Nayanika (2020) '`Firing cannons to kill mosquitoes' : controlling virtual `streets'
and the `image of the state' in Bangladesh.', Contributions to Indian sociology., 54 (2). pp. 280-305.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0069966720917923
Publisher's copyright statement:
Lacy, Mark Mookherjee, Nayanika (2020). `Firing cannons to kill mosquitoes' Controlling virtual `streets' and the
`image of the state' in Bangladesh. Contributions to Indian Sociology 54(2): 280-305. Copyright c© The Author(s).
DOI: 10.1177/0069966720917923
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
<Article Title>‘Firing cannons to kill mosquitoes’: Controlling virtual 
‘streets’ and the ‘image of the state’ in Bangladesh 
 
<Author Name> Mark Lacy  
<Author Name> Nayanika Mookherjee 
 
Lacy, Mark and Nayanika Mookherjee. 2020. ‘“Firing cannons to kill mosquitoes”: 
Controlling virtual ‘streets’ and the ‘image of the state’ in Bangladesh’ in Mascha Schulz and 
Julian Kuttig (Guest editors) edited. Ethnographies of the Bangladeshi State to commemorate 
50th anniversary of Bangladesh. Contributions to Indian Sociology, June 2020.  
 
<TS: Please set author affiliations as per the template.> 
 
Mark Lacy is at Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster University, 
Lancaster, United Kingdom. E-mail: m.lacy@lancaster.ac.uk 
 
Nayanika Mookherjee (corresponding author) is at Department of Anthropology, Durham 
University, Durham, United Kingdom. E-mail: nayanika.mookherjee@durham.ac.uk 
 
 
<Abs>This article examines the historical, social and political legacies of the Information 
and Communication Technology Act (ICT Act) (2006–2018, amended in 2013) and the 
Digital Security Act (DSA) (2018–) in the Bangladeshi state’s attempt to control the virtual 
‘streets’ of Bangladesh. The application of ICT and DSA has become an increasingly visible 
and controversial means to provide the spectacle of a state that extends disciplinary power 
and governmentality into proliferating online spaces—akin to ‘Firing cannons to kill 
mosquitoes’. We use the lens of Tim Mitchell’s structural-effect (1991, The American 
Political Science Review 85(1), 77–96) to understand the state beyond the frameworks of its 
salience or elusiveness, arguing that the criminalisation of online speech has enabled the 
creation of ‘digital vigilantes’ who are predominantly the powerful, the sycophants, a 
multitude of attention seekers who are driven by their personal contestations and ambitions. 
The legal outcomes, however, have been more ambiguous and uncertain—but the effect is to 
produce fear as an ‘environment’ (Virilio 2012, The Administration of Fear. Cambridge, MA, 
The MIT Press) through frozen/suspended charges with the potential to be redeployed in 
different contexts.</Abs> 
 
<kw>Keywords: Digital security, digital vigilantes, governmentality, structural-effect, 
surveillance</kw> 
<A Level>I 
Introduction 
On 18 November 2018, Mr Chowdhury—a self-proclaimed ‘die-hard supporter’ of the prime 
minister of Bangladesh—sent a legal notice to the cinema at the Jamuna Future Park shopping 
mall, which was screening the newly released biopic: Hasina: A Daughter’s Tale (Khan 
2018). ‘Tale’ in the title was misspelt as ‘tail’ and was corrected later. Mr Chowdhury felt 
that the spelling mistake was humiliating and demanded the Blockbuster cinema correct the 
error and apologise publicly or face a $90 million (£70 million) lawsuit. In online exchanges, 
opinion was split about the lawsuit: ‘How should I react - laugh or cry? Tale becomes tail 
which is definitely defamatory’ said one Facebook user, while another responded by saying: 
‘It’s just a typo, bro. Apparently, you are using cannons to fight mosquitoes’ (cited in BBC 
NEWS, 2018). 
This incident highlights the prevalence of events/actions where individuals feel that 
the state has been humiliated, and they need to take steps to redress it in the context of the 
Section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology Act (ICT Act 2006). First 
enacted by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in 2006, the Act was amended and made 
more draconian by the Awami League (AL) government, culminating as the harsher Digital 
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Security Act (DSA) passed on 8 October 2018 under the framework of Digital Bangladesh.1 
The aims of Section 57 are: 
 
<Block Quote Begins>If any person deliberately publishes or transmits or causes to 
be published or transmitted in the website or in any other electronic form any material 
which is false and obscene and if anyone sees, hears or reads it having regard to all 
relevant circumstances, its effect is such as to influence the reader to become 
dishonest or corrupt, or causes to deteriorate or creates possibility to deteriorate law 
and order, prejudice the image of the state or person or causes to hurt or may hurt 
religious belief or instigate against any person or organisation, then this activity will 
be regarded as an offence.2<Block Quote Ends> 
 
In short, section 57 criminalises electronic content, which is deemed to be fake and obscene, 
defamatory, hurts religious sentiments (dhormiyo onubhuti te aghat kora), could contribute to 
the deterioration of  law and order, could ‘instigate’ another person to perform harmful acts 
or could tarnish the ‘image’ of the state (rashtrer bhabmurti khunno kora). Both ICT and now 
                                                          
1During the 2008 elections the AL came up with the idea of Digital Bangladesh launched by 
the prime minister’s son. 
2See Saha (2017); Section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology Act 2006 
in Bangladesh. Available at 
http://bcc.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bcc.portal.gov.bd/page/97cc59c3_8f51_4d39_
a84b_8c0b39ae3f62/ICT_ACT_2006.pdf; Digital Security Act 2018. Available at 
https://www.cirt.gov.bd/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Digital-Security-Act-2018-English-
version.pdf; both published by Government of Bangladesh and accessed on 30 September 
2019. 
DSA have been invoked in numerous events from 2006 to 2019. Rights activists and 
journalists have been critical of section 57 from the initial stages of its development; experts 
say the provision goes against people’s right to freedom of expression and free speech, and it 
contains vague wording, allowing its misuse against journalists and social media users. In the 
case of the misspelling of the film, the DSA was not invoked, as it was a mistake, but a 
lawsuit was threatened. 
The phrase mosha marte kaman daga—firing cannons to kill mosquitoes—refers to a 
disproportionate response to a problem. Such an overblown response was also at work against 
the protests relating to the road safety movement (Schulz and Kuttig, ‘Introduction’ of this 
volume) in July–August 2018. Under the ICT Act, 86 people from over Bangladesh 
(including photographer and activist Shahidul Alam, leader of the student’s federation Maruf, 
University student Asif, actor Nawshaba and many others) were arrested and remanded 
between 3 and 15 August, 2018, in relation to the road safety movement. 
On 29 July 2018, two students, Abdul Karim and Dia Khanom Mim, of Shaheed 
Ramiz Uddin Cantonment School, were run down by a private bus in Dhaka (Lacy 2018). 
These road deaths were just two among the many that occur on a regular basis and are usually 
seen as one of the hazards of travelling in Bangladesh by road (Prothom Alo 2018). But this 
incident brought into focus the corruption that is viewed to be rife in the transportation 
industry in Bangladesh (see Kuttig in this issue) and the irresponsibility of some drivers. The 
killing of the two students galvanised school children to take to the streets, the road safety 
protests highlighting an everyday problem that affects all sectors of society in Bangladesh. 
Students carried banners in their peaceful protests declaring: ‘We don’t want Digital 
Bangladesh. We want SAFE Bangladesh’. In other words: ‘we don’t want to be promised 
ambitious visions of a secure and developed future for Bangladesh if the most basic forms of 
everyday security and safety in the present are neglected or ignored’. 
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This article seeks to examine the Bangladeshi state schemes to make its population 
‘legible’ (Scott 1999) and its implementation of the Information and Communication 
Technology Act (ICT Act) (2005/2006–2018, amended in 2013); its development into the 
Digital Security Act (DSA) on 8 October 2018 under the framework of digital Bangladesh. 
We explore the decade-long social and political implications of these new techniques of 
governmentality on social media (as outlined in the Introduction, in this article) and political 
practices in Bangladesh. We argue that the criminalisation of online speech has enabled the 
creation of digital vigilantes who are predominantly the already ‘powerful’ along with a vast 
multitude of sycophants and attention seekers who may not necessarily have much power but 
are motivated by their personal contestations, aspirations of being recognised and rewarded 
for providing services in terms of spotting and highlighting dissident or critical voices, which 
might also serve their own local rivalries. In these instances, their personal ambition is the 
critical driver rather than any enduring loyalty to the political figures. 
The spectacle of an all-powerful digital state attempts to silence discussion of the 
more mundane social and political power relations that produce and maintain a multitude of 
unrelenting and pervasive everyday insecurities, inequalities and injustices. There is a need to 
think through the concept of digital vigilantes and the way we theorise their relationship to 
the Bangladeshi state and in other similar contexts like in the spectacular, non-spectacular 
and everyday violence and vigilance (online and offline) used to shut down the protests 
relating to the Citizen Amendment Bill in India from November 2019. Hence, instead of the 
state being ‘blurred’ (Gupta 1995), or the debates over characterisations of the Bangladeshi 
state as a ‘patriarchy’ (Hassan 2006), or a patron state (Lewis 2011) or having a ‘party–state 
effect’ (Schulz this volume), we examine what Timothy Mitchell (1991) describes as the 
‘state-effect’ that is deployed to produce itself as a ubiquitous source of disciplinary power, 
as pervasive and unrelenting as anything imagined to exist in ‘surveillance societies’ or in 
‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff 2019). 
These highly visible spectacles often become far more ambiguous and uncertain as 
they unfold through digital legal mechanisms and are implemented by state agents in a 
haphazard and unpredictable way. The article explores how laws/rules laid out by legislators 
in state institutions both express and generate anxieties, producing fear as an environment 
(Virilio 2012). We also show that the attempts to curb online criticism of the state and 
individuals highlight the fear authorities have about the iterability of online speech. In the 
first and second sections of the article, we examine the arrests in August 2018, followed by 
an analysis of the manifestations of these digital laws. In the third section, we examine the 
historical legacies of ICT/DSA evident in Section 295A since 2003. While new forms of 
digital governmentality, bureaucracy and surveillance are pivotal in creating the imaginations 
of an omnipresent state, we also want to argue that the criminalisation of online speech 
highlights the vulnerability of the seemingly omniscient state. 
The article is based on ethnographic research and interviews carried out among 
middle-class activists and bloggers in Dhaka and beyond from 2003 to 2008 on Article 295A 
and again from August 2018 to October 2019 on ICT Act and DSA along with the 
examination of online reports, blogs and press clips. Respondents were selected from among 
those who were willing to speak on the issue of 295A, ICT Act, DSA and were based on a 
snowballing effect on the basis of suggestions from those willing to engage. As a result, the 
sample frame ended up being that of left-liberal activists and bloggers. At the same time, it is 
important to explore the potential ‘pitfalls’ of doing ethnography on online offences (as 
constructed by the state) as this phenomenon itself has impact on the forms of 
materialisations of the state and social media. In many of the accounts of the cases under ICT 
Act/DSA, which are occurring all across Bangladesh, the reportage is quite standardised and 
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does not include details that can enrich ethnographic analysis. As a result, cartoons, images 
and films are mostly circulated in WhatsApp groups and not shared publicly with the fear of 
defaming the state or individuals. Carrying out cyberethnography (Fernback 1999) on these 
digital laws and their manifestations has allowed us to focus on this crisis, posed new 
epistemological challenges and reconfigured the idea of the ‘field’ through various lateral 
networks within and outside Bangladesh. This method allowed us to engage and identify 
various respondents through online interactions whom we thereby followed up with offline 
engagements, which are deemed to be central to cyberethnography. Our personal experience 
of events of August 2018, which we outline in the next section, and our long-term 
ethnographic engagements (Lacy 2018; Mookherjee 2015)3 allowed us to look back 
historically, diachronically, analytically and contextually from accounts which might seem to 
be ‘anecdotal’ and ‘journalistic’. 
 
<A Level>II 
‘Axing one’s own feet’: The arrests in August 2018 
Policing streets, motorways and cities remains one of the most powerful illustrations of a 
state’s competency and ability to control territory and provide safety and security (Virilio 
2006). As circulation in Dhaka city was slowed down in July 2018 (more than the usual 
janjot/jams), as young people took to the streets peacefully for many days, anxiety about the 
state’s ability to ‘keep things moving’ and control the potential for urban disruption surfaced 
in relation to the protests on road crashes. The idiom ‘firing cannons to kill mosquitoes’ 
                                                          
3 See Lacy, Mark. 2018. ‘Dhaka: How Speeding Bus Drivers Sparked a Student Insurrection,’ 
The Conversation, September 18 2018.  https://theconversation.com/dhaka-how-speeding-
bus-drivers-sparked-a-student-insurrection-102744  Accessed on 30/09/2019.  
 
materialised when disproportionate force was exercised by motorcycle-helmeted assailants 
(suspected to be ruling parties’ youth wing) who—in ‘cahoots’ with the state security 
forces—attacked some of the protestors, photographers and journalists. These incidents were 
filmed, posted online—on the virtual ‘streets’—shared and widely circulated through the 
citizens’ own ‘vision machines’: mobile phone messaging and Facebook live posts. 
Vision, Virilio argues, is revolutionised in the modern age—in particular, by the 
innovations that occur in the military realm and the technologies that seek to see the 
battlefield/enemy better (Virilio 2006). While the possibilities of surveillance and vision are 
transformed by military (and policing) desires, the individual can record and document events 
in the city with their own ‘vision machines’. The renowned photographer and activist 
Shahidul Alam took to the streets of his city on his bicycle with such a vision machine to 
visually record, document and report (via live Facebook posts) what was going on. He 
tweeted a picture of his camera that was smashed as he moved around the city, by armed 
(with sticks and machetes) helmeted assailants. As more of the videos of the protests and 
attacks by helmeted assailants circulated online, there emerged intense governmental unease 
and paranoia about the ‘virtual streets’ of social media. A digital fog descended over Internet 
access, making it harder to circulate images and information.4 
We were watching the events of Dhaka online from Kolkata as we were due to travel 
to Bangladesh for a research trip in August 2018. After getting assurances from friends in 
                                                          
4See https://www.theatlas.com/charts/HJ-mGIx0m (Accessed on 30/09/2019) for disruption 
of the Internet before elections, which seems to be a global tactic. Sustained shutdowns, such 
as those in recent years in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mali, Kashmir (by India in 2019) 
and Rohingya camps (by Bangladesh in 2019) have been characterised as forms of ‘digital 
siege, wearing down public dissent under the guise of pacifying volatile situations’ (Rydzak 
2018: 13). 
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Dhaka, we bought our tickets to Dhaka in the afternoon of 5 August 2018 to fly out on 6 
August afternoon. At 10.30 p.m. on 5 August, we saw posts online that Shahidul Alam was 
abducted from his home by 30–35 ‘plain clothes’ police. This occurred after Alam had posted 
live images of the attack on students on Facebook and had given an interview to Al Jazeera 
on the political conditions in Bangladesh. With elections on the horizon, his comments 
clearly irritated key politicians in the administration. Rahnuma Ahmed, Shahidul’s partner 
and a fellow anthropologist, has been a long-term friend and so the news about Shahidul was 
extremely distressing. As we landed in Dhaka, we heard that along with the government 
crackdown on peaceful protests by school children, the police had arrested 22 university 
students who were protesting in support of the movement. They were also remanded and 
denied bail for several weeks. Shahidul had not been made to ‘disappear’ (goom)5 but was 
detained by the DB—the detective branch—of Bangladesh in connection with allegations of 
having committed an offence under section 57 of ICT. A DB officer filed the case against 
Alam as he was deemed to have expressed defamatory, false news, tarnishing the image of 
the state in his Al Jazeera interview. 
After being picked up, and before being remanded, Alam had allegedly been tortured. 
He was first presented in court on 6 August barefooted, his body held by police officers. 
After the legal hearings, he was sent to jail under the ICT. His bail hearing was set for 11 
September, but he was refused bail five times without any reasons being given. This incident 
shocked civil society in Bangladesh. A public discourse emerged in government-affiliated 
media and among civil society intellectuals that deemed him to be an ‘agent’ of various 
                                                          
5In the last 10 years, 532 individuals have ‘disappeared’. See reports from Human Rights 
Watch at https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/22/enforced-disappearances-met-denials-
bangladesh (Accessed on 30/09/2019). But the government considers these claims to have the 
‘obvious intention of maligning its achievements’. 
countries and an anti-liberation element, as one of his uncles—his maternal grandmother's 
brother—was a collaborator during the war of 1971. What remained unaddressed in this 
discourse is that his other uncle was one of the founding members of AL (Ahasan 2018). 
While some started making demands that Alam should be released, most of the buddhijibis 
(intellectuals), usually regarded as the voice of conscience, remained mute. Caricatures were 
circulating in WhatsApp groups of the State authorities holding up Alam as an exemplary 
example and telling a group of silent, huddled familiar buddhijibis: buddhi maraile bhainga 
dimu (if you use your intelligence, I will break you). There were rumours of videos being 
released through WhatsApp and Facebook, implicating other prominent people in the arts, 
publishing and journalism—which might have been another reason for only a few to raise 
their voices in protest.6 
There was, however, a quick dissemination of this news in the international press, 
and it grew into a global campaign, involving international organisations and individuals (no 
governments however)7 seeking justice for Shahidul. These organisations included the United 
Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, a large group of Nobel laureates, PEN International, 
Human Rights Watch, Professor Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, various photographers, writers, 
academics and cultural activists from across the world and South Asia. Amnesty International 
declared him to be a Prisoner of Conscience (Amnesty International UK 2018, 7 August). In 
                                                          
6On 28 August 2018, five lawyers, activists, academics and a poet were simultaneously 
arrested in different cities in India through dawn raids because of their dissent with the 
policies of the central government. They remain under house arrest and are charged under the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act or UAPA, a stringent anti-terror law under which it is 
much harder to get bail. 
7In August 2018, we found national and regional Indian newspapers were reluctant to criticise 
the Shahidul case. 
11 
 
spite—and maybe because—of this international movement to demand the release of 
Shahidul, the Bangladeshi government remained resolute to keep Shahidul in jail and finally 
released him only on 20 November 2018, just 1 month before the controversial elections on 
30 December 2018.8 
It is important to reflect on the paradoxical nature of this phenomenon. The image of 
the state is believed to be tarnished in the face of any non-adulatory international publicity. 
The imposition of bans, pre-emptive censorship, abductions, deterrent incarcerations also 
legitimises and strengthens the negative reputation seemingly tarnished through such 
publicity. At the same time, as the state attempts to produce a spectacle of increasingly 
granular and local power, surveillance and policing, an uncontrollable global spectacle 
emerges of a state that appears increasingly unstable and unpredictable, driven by 
individualised vindictiveness that overwhelms other geo-political strategic considerations, a 
state obsessed with the harm done to the ‘image of the state’ but now publicly self-harming. 
The attack and arrest of students and Alam by the government in the run up to the 
December elections of 2018 was surprising. Some felt that with this incident, the state ‘was 
axing its own feet’—carrying out an action, which is harmful to oneself. Not only had the 
government fulfilled its promise to set up the International Crimes Tribunal (albeit 
controversial but considered as significant by a large proportion of the electorate in 
Bangladesh),9 it had also executed well-known collaborators of the war of 1971 (which had 
                                                          
8Activists and public intellectuals have been continuing to speak out about the controversial 
elections of December 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxs3AAZ4Fgg (Accessed 
on 30/09/2019) 
9Polling in 2013 by A.C. Nielsen found that more than two-thirds of Bangladeshis 
characterise the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) as ‘unfair’ or ‘very 
unfair’, though 86 per cent support its implementation. The Economist (2013, 17 September). 
predominantly popular support in the country), talked convincingly of development for the 
country (as it aims to be a middle-income country by its 50th anniversary of independence in 
2021) and had been lauded internationally for giving shelter to the thousands of Rohingya 
refugees fleeing persecution by the Myanmar government. At the same time, various 
questions were being raised about the government in relation to the democratic deficit, human 
rights violations relating to disappearances and repression of opposition party leaders and 
protests as shown through the protest movements. The elaboration on the various cases filed 
under ICT/DSA will highlight the operation of the digital laws. 
 
<A Level>III 
Manifestations of digital laws 
 
Digital life in Bangladesh started in 1996 with the advent of the Internet in the country. The 
usage of the technology had risen by 517.3 per cent around 2012.10 In 2015, the nation had 
over 120 million mobile subscribers and 43 million Internet subscribers (Rahman 2015). As 
Bangla fonts and keyboards came to be developed in 2005, community blogging picked up in 
Bangladesh, and bloggers became a growing presence. In 2006, the Information and 
Communication Technology Act was enacted by the BNP–Jamaat government. The 
maximum punishment for offences under section 57 was a 10-year imprisonment and a fine 
of BDT 10 million. Police had to seek permission from the authorities concerned to file a 
case and arrest any person under the law. Between 2006, when the law was first enacted by 
the BNP government, and 2013, when it was amended by the AL government, police data 
show that while there were 426 complaints, only a few resulted in arrests or prosecution 
(Bergman 2019). The huge rise in cases occurred after 2013. The laws were changed to make 
                                                          
10 Haque (2011, 151) as cited in Chowdhury (2012). 
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it much easier to arrest without warrant on any of the six broad charges of Section 57 just 
after the filing of a case under the ICT Act; to make it more difficult to get bail; and to 
increase penalties to draconian levels (minimum of 7 years and a maximum of 10/14 years).11 
During the British colonial period, a provision was incorporated into the Criminal 
Procedure Code (CrPC), empowering courts to issue direct arrest warrant against persons, 
including journalists, writers and publishers of any books or newspapers, if they wrote or said 
anything defamatory. Under the Penal Code of 1860, one could be punished with 
imprisonment for a maximum of 2 years, or with a fine, or with both, for defaming others. 
These colonial-era penal codes have been retained in most South Asian countries, including 
Bangladesh, only to be invoked at crucial junctures. Here, the amended, more punitive 
version, has criminalised online speech and a range of acts. The trajectory of the ICT/ DSA 
cases until September 2019 would also help us comprehend the implications of the possibility 
for Bangladeshi citizens to criminalise a range of online speech and acts, to ‘legally’ 
charge/remand/fine fellow citizens for ‘posting’, ‘liking’ and ‘sharing’ opinions on social 
media, which might tarnish the image of the state/person. 
In 2011, charges of defamation were brought by a local AL politician in Mymensingh 
against the microfinance pioneer Muhammad Yunus over comments he made about 
Bangladeshi politicians in a 2007 media interview. Yunus had to appear in court, pay a fine 
and he soon was removed from Grameen Bank, and investigations into his financial matters 
were started by the government authorities. He is said to have angered the government for 
backing the military-backed interim government (2006–2008) and trying to set up his own 
                                                          
11See https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/bangladesh-ict-act-the-trap-section-of-57-
1429336 In 2015, The Indian Supreme Court struck down almost a similar section (66A of 
the Information Technology Act), terming it unconstitutional.. The communication 
clampdown on Kashmir since 5 August 2019, however, continues as we write. 
political party in 2008. The draconian amendment of the ICT law in October 2013 followed 
soon after the Shahbagh protests, demanding the controversial death penalty of collaborators 
of the war of 1971 as the latter had enjoyed political impunity for the last 40 years. 
These death penalties also resulted in the resurrection and strengthening of Hefazat e 
Islam, a group based in a qawmi madrassa (orthodox Islamic school) that has been holding 
counterdemonstrations and rallies in Bangladesh, demanding the execution of so-called 
atheist bloggers and stopping the Shahbagh protests. Many of the participants at these rallies 
were supposedly young, male and poor students of the madrassas. On 5 May 2013, Hefazat 
held a rally in the commercial centre of Dhaka. When a human rights organisation published 
reports on these demonstrators being killed by security forces, its director and secretary were 
charged under ICT and denied bail. 
The debate and demand for the repeal of Section 57 intensified, following the arrest of 
journalist Probir Sikdar in 2015. The veteran journalist was arrested and sent to jail after he 
posted a status on Facebook, expressing fear that his life was in danger and that an AL 
minister, a businessman and a fugitive war criminal should be held responsible if he were 
killed. Following the post, an AL leader filed a criminal case against Probir in Faridpur under 
Section 57 of the ICT act for ‘tarnishing the image’ of the minister. In September 2015, 
Mohan Kumar Mondal and his colleague were arrested in Satkhira after an AL activist filed a 
case alleging that a Facebook post by Mondal had hurt the religious beliefs of Muslims. The 
post criticised Saudi Arabia’s security arrangements during the Haj that led to a deathly 
stampede killing hundreds. The men were detained for 2 months before the Cyber Tribunal 
finally granted bail on 29 November 2015. 
Many of those who complained to the police are explicitly linked to political parties. 
In August 2016, Rashedul Isam Raju, General Secretary of AL’s student wing at Rajshahi 
University complained to the police about the Facebook posts supposedly made by Dilip Roy, 
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a student from a leftist opposition party. Roy remained in custody for 3 months before the 
High Court granted him bail. Raju also organised a Facebook Page event (Kuttig and 
Suykens forthcoming) to elaborate on the charge he brought against Roy. The editor of Daily 
Star, Mahfuz Anam was charged with defamation and treason in more than 80 cases filed by 
AL workers in 2016, with damages sought exceeding US$8 billion. They were filed in 
various lower courts across Bangladesh, forcing him to run around the country seeking bail, 
and he has had to obtain periodic ‘stays’ on them ever since. This means these charges could 
be revived if Anam was felt to exercise too much press freedom. Prothom Alo, another 
critical national newspaper, has faced more than 100 criminal charges and, along with Daily 
Star, are being deliberately starved of advertising revenue with advertisers pressured to not 
support them (Reuters 2018, 13 December). 
ICT charges were brought on people from all walks of life. In April 2017, Monirul 
Islam, a rubber plantation worker from Srimongol, was arrested for ‘defaming the country’s 
prime minister’ by liking and sharing a Facebook post that included a caricature of the 
prime minister. A case was filed against him for condemning Islam under Section 57 of the 
Information and Communication Technology Act, describing his actions as a ‘betrayal to 
the country’. Islam was denied bail and detained for over 3 months before the High Court 
issued papers for his release. The author of the original Facebook post went into hiding for 
fear of his own arrest (Freize 2018, 14 August). In May 2017, Nipun Chandra Das and 
Sanjoy Banerjee, local correspondent of The Asian Age and Dainik Janakantha were sued 
by the secretary of the local AL, following their reports on the torture of a Hindu woman by 
a local gang who attempted to grab her land (Saha 2017: 26). In July 2018, a professor of 
Sociology in Chittagong University expressed his support for the student’s road safety and 
quota reform movements and protested against the assaults on these students by ruling party 
members on social media. On 13 July, a day after the government told parliament it was 
impossible to accede to some student demands, he posted two words on Facebook ‘Hasi Na’ 
(meaning ‘not laughing’). Soon AL activists filed a complaint against him under the ICT Act, 
accusing him of defaming the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The academic was arrested and 
jailed for more than a month before he got bail, and if he loses the case, he faces up to 14 
years in prison. 
On the night of 4 August 2018, police arrested Nusrat Jahan Sonia, a 25-year-old 
primary school teacher, in a rural area south of Dhaka. They said she had ‘written something 
anti-state’, arrested her and seized her mobile phone and laptop. Seven-months pregnant, she 
was held for nearly 2 weeks for ‘spreading rumours’ under section 57 because she shared a 
Facebook post that appealed for peace during the August 2018 road safety movement. 
According to a family member, she has been suspended from her job at a government school. 
By exploring the nature of the cases filed, the convictions, the process of enforcement 
or. more specifically, the non-conviction of these laws, status of the cases post-acquittal and 
the reasons for the charges being brought, we get a vivid idea of state action in this domain. 
Once a Cyber Tribunal dedicated to dealing with offences under the ICT Act was established, 
the number of complaints to the police, arrests and prosecutions soared. Hundreds, including 
several journalists, have been accused under section 57 for criticising the government, 
political leaders and others. The Daily Star has found that 11 cases have been filed against 21 
journalists, since March 2017, related to news reports (Adhikary 2017). A total of 260 cases 
were filed between March 2017 and the first week of June 2017 (Adhikary 2018). In the first 
3 months of 2018, police submitted 282 charge sheets with Cyber Tribunal officials and 
1,271 charge sheets between 2013 and April 2018. Most involve charges of criticism of the 
government, defamation or offending religious sentiments, tarnishing the image of the state, 
while the rest are allegations against men publishing intimate photographs of women without 
their consent. 
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On 8 April 2018, after student protests, a police officer filed a complaint referring to 
43 ‘provocative’ Facebook posts, which ‘many have liked and commented on’ that has, as a 
result, ‘created a situation which could potentially harm society and create chaos’(ibid.). 
Similarly, in August 2018, 28 twitter handles and accounts were charged. It is important to 
note that for all the visibility surrounding these cases, there are relatively few convictions 
resulting from prosecutions. In September 2017, Md Nazrul Islam Shamim, special public 
prosecutor of the Cyber Tribunal, told The Dhaka Tribune that 65–70 per cent of cases filed 
under section 57 cannot be proved in court. ‘Some cases are totally fabricated and are filed to 
harass people’, he said. Shamim’s comment is reflective of the much broader issue of ‘false 
cases’ that has been used as an instrument by both the state and influential individuals. There 
are also concerns that some of the accused—like the aforementioned respondent Mondal—
had their accounts ‘hacked’. 
In terms of the enforcement and, in fact, non-conviction of the laws, in the first 3 
months of 2018, eight of the nine cases where trials were concluded were acquitted. This 
phenomenon of few convictions of the ICT/DSA cases and the concomitant harassment 
implicit in the process is similar to the ‘logic of non-enforcement’ described by Berger (this 
volume) or, more specifically, the logic of non-conviction. His article investigates the ways in 
which state and non-state law becomes intertwined in practices of conflict resolution in rural 
Chittagong. According to his logic of non-enforcement, people in rural Bangladesh 
frequently appeal to state courts—but not to get binding and enforceable verdicts. The threat 
of the state courts is supposed to alter the dynamics of non-state justice institutions in their 
favour. In the ICT cases, it is evident that gaining conviction in court is not necessarily the 
critical objective. The very fact of being charged results in a chain reaction of harassment and 
social sanctions, some of which may be held in reserve for suitable future occasions. In these 
instances, the law is being enforced, and the underlying objectives are being attained in 
effect, even if there is no conviction. Accordingly, the crucial point would appear to be non-
conviction rather than non-enforcement. 
It is important to note that similar to the ICT/DSA cases, which are primarily brought 
in by the powerful, rarely can the poor bring about a shalish12 in rural Bangladesh. We are 
comparing the phenomenon of shalish with the manifestation of these Acts as highlighted in 
Berger’s article but not necessarily of their legal and social consequences. So, in the case of 
ICT/DSA cases, while there are few convictions, the process of remand and arrest seeks to 
suppress dissent and carries social consequences. Individuals face the constant threat of being 
arrested, held in pretrial detention, subjected to expensive criminal trials, fines and 
imprisonment, as well as the social stigma associated with having a criminal record. In 
addition, such treatment may chill free speech. ‘The government has reassured the public of 
their commitment to freedom of speech’, the Dhaka Tribune, deemed to be a pro-government 
newspaper, said in a September 2017 editorial. ‘Then why does section 57 continue to be a 
tool of harassment?’ Above all, even after individuals are acquitted on ICT Act/DSA, charges 
are not dropped with the potential to be revived in case the individual does not conform to 
being non-dissenting. But, here, it is the accusation that is fundamental to the spectacle of 
state power over the individual in the online sphere. 
Exploring the various cases, it seems the main intent with which it is being used was 
to threaten and frighten people into inaction and silence. As Saha (2017: 26) notes: the legal 
tool of ICT was actively used by a dominant political party as a threat to file cases against its 
opposition as a means of harassment through the paying of fines and imprisonment. Powerful 
leaders have also used it to stifle criticism. In instances where stories of corruption and self-
                                                          
12Shalish is a social system for informal adjudication of petty disputes prevalent in 
Bangladesh. For the considerable scholarship on the Bangladeshi shalish, see Ahmed (2013) 
and Siddiqi (2011). 
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aggrandisement has been leaked, the ICT has been invoked to stop these accounts from 
circulating. Most of the time, section 57 has been used by the established, rich and powerful 
(AL politicians and their acolytes, judges, companies, local chairmen, priests, madrassah 
heads) at local and national levels with contacts among the police to stop investigations by 
journalists (quite a few instances of Hindu journalists), editors of online portals, of 
accusations of corruption and attempts to highlight the misuse of power by the powerful. 
Social media users have also been booked under section 57 for publishing online newspaper 
reports or liking/sharing others posts.13 In August 2018, activists talked about fear as an 
environment as they tried to stop leaving a digital trace by not liking, sharing or commenting 
on online posts about social and political issues, leaders and influential people (Shakhawat 
2017). In 2019, a similar restraint was exercised by Indians who are critical of their 
government’s actions of revoking section 370 in Jammu and Kashmir. 
As Kutting and Sukyens (forthcoming) have illustrated, student politics—which 
historically has been significant in key political events—in Bangladesh is used as a means for 
developing careers in business and government and as a resource for political parties for a 
range of tasks, from large-scale political events to hartals. The ‘visibility’ that students 
cultivate and perform via social media might extend through to deploying new laws against 
opponents and even creating a Facebook event page to publicise to the local and national 
echelons of the party how they have used the ICT law against those who are ‘tarnishing the 
image of the state’. Here, workers may be seeking visibility with their employers in the same 
way students seek visibility with their parties. Even the simple and mundane act of liking or 
commenting on a post becomes a potentially self-destructive act, an act that ‘brings’ the state 
into one’s most intimate environments. The tragic murder of engineering student Abrar Fahad 
in October 2019 brought home the extreme actions being taken by the digital vigilantes 
                                                          
13See Schulz (2020) for a similar outrage over a Facebook post. 
(Daily Star 2019, 7 October). Abrar was ‘grilled’ by AL student activists for his critical 
Facebook post on the India–Bangladesh water deal, was suspected of being involved with the 
Islamicist student group Shibir and thereafter beaten to death, which led to widespread 
protests in Bangladeshi universities. 
State practices, here, set out to monitor and transform behaviour through what 
Foucault (2004) would describe as governmentality, the internalisation of power into one’s 
physical acts, movements, instincts and thought processes (the gentle click of a ‘like’). At the 
same time, the threat of the circulation of WhatsApp rumours and the exemplary verdicts set 
up with the remands of Alam and others serves as an effective deterrent for civil society 
intellectuals who are usually considered to be the voices of conscience in Bangladesh. The 
social and political phenomena emerging from the exercise of the ICT/DSA show that 
through this legal instrument, the state is not only a source of surveillance but enables 
influential citizens to feel defamed and to bring legal complaints against those who have 
insulted them. So, here, the role of the sovereign is carried out locally and exemplifies the 
sense of governmentality. Along with the existing powerful coteries and formal agents of the 
state invoking this law, certain groups of self-seeking ‘citizens’ and sycophants are involved 
in surveillance and making accusations as local and digital vigilantes. So not only do the 
locally powerful use the ICT and act as the eyes of the state, it also enables powerful citizens 
and their acolytes to build up a local politics of patronage and fear. The threat of invoking 
ICT’s infamous clause 57 legitimises the party locally and nationally, while, at the same time, 
enables them to try to gain attention of those more powerful than them. This phenomenon 
illustrates Mitchell’s conception of the state effect as the state–society boundaries, which are 
internally deemed to be distinct, come to be based on complex power relations and power 
aggrandisement. The technical innovations of the ICT make the Bangladeshi state external to 
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these local/individualised interventions to police online activities and yet through which the 
state effect is conjured through sycophancy. 
After the detentions and imprisonments in August 2018, the DSA was enacted in 
October 2018. Bangladesh’s journalists are concerned about Section 32 of this act, which will 
treat the use of secret recordings to expose corruption and other crimes as espionage, arguing 
that it will restrict investigative journalism and muzzle media freedom. State representatives 
justify the passing of the Digital Security Act (Wazed 2019) to protect citizen data and 
privacy, to safeguard against false or inflammatory digital publications that incite violence14 
and to prevent anyone spreading misinformation about the liberation war and its 3 million 
dead. As a result, in July 2019, a Digital Security Agency has been set up with cooperation 
from Facebook, and the government will intervene in any content on social media from 
September 2019, to use ‘collected technology’ to collect data.15 
The state in upholding the DSA for its citizens is also a guarantor for not hurting the 
citizen’s feelings of defamation and comes to encompass those defamed because of 
investigations into their corruption and those offended by blasphemous rumours, images and 
                                                          
14Similar arguments about the misuse of information technology was made by the Indian 
government in its efforts to retain section 66A and to ‘retain religious harmony’. In 2015, the 
Indian Supreme Court declared the provision unconstitutional. Nonetheless, social media is 
being referred to as a new ‘serial killer’—and in May 2018, at least 16 people have been 
lynched by mobs fuelled by posts circulating through Facebook and WhatsApp. In 
Pakistan, various artists and university students have been brutally attacked for their art and 
social media posts, which have been deemed to be blasphemous. 
15The Egyptian government recently passed an amendment to the media and press law No. 92 
that deems social media users and blogs with more than 5,000 followers to be media or press 
outlets and, therefore, subject to the country’s laws and restrictions on journalists. 
satire. Further, it links up these state practices to the practices of other states by invoking the 
Holocaust denial framework to justify clauses against the dissemination of misinformation 
relating to the liberation war. The following section explores how the clauses of ‘hurting 
religious sentiments’ and ‘prejudicing the image of the state’ have been used prior to this 
contemporary predicament. 
 
<A Level>IV 
Policing of onubhuti (feelings) and bhabmurti (image): 2003–2018 
 
The draconian nature of Bangladesh’s digital laws has its precursors in Article 295A (2003), 
which reinforced the presence of the state in the everyday life of Bangladeshi citizens through 
ICT Act/DSA. It is in this context that we need to identify the contours of how the state is 
seen (Scott 1998) by the state itself and by others who agree that the bhab (any state of mind 
or body, way of thinking or feeling,) murti (image) is made khunno (tarnished). This 
tarnishing of the image becomes the ground for state action on the basis of which books and 
films are banned (in the case of Taslima Nasreen elaborated below) and citizens are exiled 
and imprisoned. 
The most well-known and exemplary use of the phrase dhormiyo onubhutite aghat, 
(hurting religious sentiments) has been used by both the Bangladeshi and West Bengal (of 
India) governments to ban the books and writings of a Bangladeshi physician and author—
Taslima Nasrin—known for her militant views against gendered inequality. A fatwa was first 
issued against her, following an interview in The Statesman (9 May 1994), in which she 
allegedly demanded the revision of the Koran. This was preceded by the publication of her 
novel Lojja (Shame, Nasreen, 1993), which portrays the nightmare which befell a Hindu 
(Duttas) family in Bangladesh in the face of a backlash on minority Hindu communities in 
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Bangladesh. This backlash occurred in response to the demolition of the Babri Masjid at 
Ayodhya in India on 6 December 1992 and the consequent killing of Muslims in India. Lojja 
ends with a poignant note as the Duttas leave Bangladesh for India. Lojja was banned in 
Bangladesh in 1993, and, subsequently, four more of Nasreen’s books were banned by the 
Government of Bangladesh and the Communist government of West Bengal, India, by 
invoking Section 295A of the Penal Code as the books were considered to ‘hurt religious 
sentiments’. The prosecutions under 295A made Nasreen leave Bangladesh and seek exile in 
Sweden. 
The notion of hurting religious sentiments—dhormiyo onubhutite aghat, is a reference 
to onubhuti—feelings or affective states—which seem to be central to these contestations. At 
the same time, this affective language coincides with allusions to Nasreen and her work by a 
set of intellectuals and activists who would say ‘let’s not talk about her’ or let out a visceral 
chi chi—an expression which stands in for shame and condemnation. The banning of these 
books by the Bangladesh and the West Bengal governments followed court injunctions 
brought by a set of intellectuals in both Bangladesh and West Bengal as Nasreen wrote about 
how they had sexually propositioned/harassed her. The books were, however, banned because 
they are deemed to be an affront to religious sentiments and are considered to be 
‘pornographic’ and ‘with no literary value’ (Naoreen 2004: 75). 
The bans on the first two autobiographies of Taslima Nasrin became co-terminus with 
the BNP government’s concern to penalise activities that tarnish the image of the state. From 
2001 onwards, a series of incidents seemed to confirm this concern: both the attacks and 
charges of sedition brought against human rights activists, highlighting the rape of minorities 
in Bangladesh and the Indemnity Ordinance given to army officials involved in the 
‘Operation Clean-Heart’, which was put into effect in January 2002, to curb the ‘law and 
order’ situation in Bangladesh leading to 44 deaths. It is in this terrifying context of actions 
taken by the government with regard to tarnishing the image of the state that a chilling, 
contagious atmosphere of self-censorship enveloped the left-liberal intellectuals, feminists, 
students, writers and journalists who primarily saw themselves as adversaries of the BNP 
government and its policies. A decade later, in 2013, when bloggers were arrested by the AL 
government, they were also booked under the ICT Act of 2006 as they were deemed to have 
hurt religious sentiments. Here, the distressing effect on secular sentiment under an AL 
government is acutely felt by these secular bloggers according to whom legislation on 
religions sentiments is deemed to be against the spirit of the Liberation war. Referring to the 
role of surveillance carried out by the state through section 57 of the ICT Act, they refer to it 
as digital ojuhat not digital projukti (digital excuse not digital development). 
The ICT Act/DSA enables the state to undertake surveillance and refine 
governmentality by extending the eyes of the state so that all citizens who are offended can 
be digital vigilantes on behalf of the state, creating an alliance of the defamed with the state at 
its helm. It also enables a process of repetitive and explicit censorship even though it is 
marked by unpredictability with the possibilities of the threat of ICT Act/DSA to the 
offenders within a culture of deterrence produced to deter future offenders. The ICT Act/DSA 
and its concomitant censorship also produce ‘subjects according to explicit and implicit 
norms’ and ‘the production of the subject has everything to do with the regulation of speech’ 
(Butler 1997: 133). Butler (ibid.: 129) refers to such action as a pre-emptive censor, which 
attempts to regulate the sphere of public discourse by institutionalising the norms that 
establish what ought properly to be included there. When censorship operates prior to speech, 
it constitutes the norms by which the speakable (here defamable) is differentiated from the 
unspeakable (undefamable). 
Through the presence or the absence of posts, the activists’ alliance with the Shahidul 
case apparently became clear. In both Nasreen and Shahidul’s case, the legal charges were 
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intertwined with one-sided rumours about their personal lives. Hence, the state practices 
through the ICT Act/DSA produced a public and a subject who is prescribed by the norms of 
non-defamation. In determining the digitally and virtually speakable discourse and its 
constitutive norm, we have the operation of Mitchell’s state effect, where the state is neither 
salient nor elusive. The state structure, instead, appears external to society though internally 
bound by complex power relations. Along with the control of the norms of the digital 
discourse of offendability, the state practices of the ICT Act/DSA also led to the interrogation 
of the subjectivity of Nasreen and Alam and an effective response towards the phenomenon. 
 
<A Level>V 
Conclusion: Fighting with one’s own shadow 
The Bangladeshi state is a transnational, virtual phenomenon produced and represented in 
many sites, establishing the norms of defamation through an affective form of litigiousness. 
The state depends on affective and spectacular forms of publicity through the deployment of 
phrases such as ‘hurting religious sentiments’ and ‘tarnishing the image of the state’. Their 
historical trajectories precede the onset of section 57 of the ICT Act (2006–2018) and 
continue into the DSA from 2018. We have shown in this article how digital laws laid out by 
legislators in state institutions both express and produce anxieties and also how through the 
phenomenon of digital vigilantes, these rules are implemented in a haphazard and 
unpredictable way. In fact, laws here work as tools for the logic of non-conviction but with 
huge social fallouts for those charged under ICT Act/DSA. The retention of colonial legal 
frameworks in the subcontinent allows them to be revived to discipline a population. The idea 
of tarnishing the image of the state is very new, at least in the law—which has moved from 
earlier notions of sedition, requiring actual steps to overthrow the government through to this 
idea of mere expression being sufficient to cause harm. As a result, the non-dismissed 
lawsuits against those charged under ICT Act/DSA enable a continuation of control and 
unease and serve as a spectacle of deterrence as well as sycophancy. 
As we have shown, the legal outcomes have, on occasion, been ambiguous and 
uncertain, but the effect was to produce an environment of fear and strategies of deterrence 
that aim to control and contain political debate in the public sphere. In this sense, anxiety and 
concern about the social relations or networks of power in Bangladesh, the links between 
business and political/legal power and authority, become harder to establish in the face of a 
state that creates the performance of an omniscient and omnipresent state. Historian Afsan 
Choudhury notes: ‘Hate, insults, endless allegations and occasional physical confrontations 
have become the staple of Bangladesh’s political culture’ (Chowdhury 2018). In terms of the 
pressure placed on journalists, cases of legal harassment rose from 33 in 2013 to 169 in 2017, 
but the use of physical force and assault as a silencing tactic decreased from 173 in 2013 to 
113 in 2017 (Article 19 2018). This might reflect a move from more material forms of 
violence and intimidation to subtle and legal attempts at control. Already there is a growing 
and conspicuous silence on public criticism of the government and online and social media-
based criticism of the government has evidently declined since the passage of the DSA. 
The preponderance of these digital laws has been intertwined with the sacrosanct 
discourse of the Liberation War. As scholars continuing to work on the war for over 2 
decades in Bangladesh, we argue that 1971 has become a technology of rule for the state. The 
release of the docudrama (with which we started the article)—Hasina: A Daughter’s Tale—a 
month before the elections of December 2018, focuses on the assassination of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rehman and his entire family. The focus in this film on the effect of that 
assassination on the premier and the sacrifices made by the family on behalf of the nation 
through its leadership in the war of liberation is an illustration of the significance 1971 has 
for the current Bangladeshi state to rule the country. In the DSA, digital laws not only 
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disallow the questioning of the contested enumerative community of 1971 (‘3 million dead’), 
it has also made it punitive to make any online criticism of Sheikh Mujib. Given the 
restrictions placed by the government-inflicted digital laws, one can comprehend 1971, and 
work on it can only be seen within this nationalist project. This makes ethnographic work on 
the state even more difficult today. An activist puts the paradox succinctly in a personal 
communication in October 2019: 
<Block Quote Begins>Does Bengali nationalism get nullified as roots of secularism, 
equality just because they are used as autocratic weapons by the state? Do we throw 
the baby out with the bath water as I find apparent in most modern rights discourses? 
Or do we explore creative ways of going back to the roots and reinventing democratic 
spaces?<Block Quote Ends> 
 
The implementation of the ICT Act and the campaigns surrounding it have influenced the 
younger generation who are attempting to reinvent these democratic spaces. We were told by 
University students in Dhaka how they decided not only to self-censor but also subversively 
screen Satyajit Ray’s film Hirok Rajar Deshe (Banerjee 2013) (In the Land of the Diamond 
King) or stage a play based on the film as part of college events in front of visiting ministers 
and as a way of critiquing the state practices linked to ICT Act. A children’s film, a musical 
comedy, Hirok Rajar Deshe contains a subtle and powerful critique of inverted 
totalitarianism. Without any use of violence on its citizens, this kind of totalitarianism is 
based on the political apathy of its citizens and what the film terms mogoj dholai 
(brainwashing). According to activists and students, in the 1980s, when this film was shown 
in Bangladesh at the time of the anti-military demonstrations, the words of the songs in the 
film were drawn overnight on the walls of the city. 
While new forms of digital governmentality, bureaucracy and surveillance are pivotal 
in creating the imaginations of an omnipresent state, we also want to argue that the 
deployment of the ICT Act and DSA highlights the vulnerability of the seemingly omniscient 
state. The state’s paranoia about the digital age becomes focused on using the tools of the 
digital age as a technique of deterrence, both the individualisation of deterrence (focused on a 
key, prominent figure) and the magnification of this deterrence (compared to the earlier 
events involving Nasreen), marking everyday life and behaviours and through the production 
of a national and international spectacle. As the technologies and techniques that appear to be 
able to challenge the state seem to multiply, the modalities of deterring the citizenry appear to 
proliferate and intensify, moving from an anxiety over what one can read or discuss through 
to what one can ‘like’ or ‘post’. 
Through an obsession with tarnishing the image of the state, a new image of the state 
is produced: an accelerating, expanding and mutating machine that presents itself as 
omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent, a machine that can make local, molecular events 
(such as an arrest or accusation) national or global, an element in a spectacle of deterrence; a 
machine that can make national events or policies feel increasingly local and personal, 
individualised or intimate, expanding and intensifying an environment of fear. What is 
alarming here is how new laws are being used to limit discussion of older, more ‘traditional’ 
problems (corruption, problems of governance, violations of rights, denial of democratic 
rights and space), and the invocation of ‘older’ problems (the hurting of religious sentiment, 
tarnishing the image of the state) is being deployed in attempts to control the new 
technologies that the state is both seduced by and terrified of—the poison and cure of Digital 
Bangladesh—while it continues to fight with one’s own shadow in its search for adversaries. 
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